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Highlights
•	 Revenues	 of	 “standard”	 power	 generation	 assets	 in	 the	 EU	 are	 strongly	
impacted	by	massive	renewables.	Due	concerns	have	emerged	on	the	ability	
of	“energy	only”	markets	to	ensure	generation	adequacy	over	the	next	decade.	
Some	Member	 States	 are	 considering	 “national	 only”	 generation	 adequacy	
mechanisms,	 conceived	 to	address	 issues	 that	are	 specific	 to	each	Member	
State.	Therefore	it	is	not	obvious	that	a	common	“regional”	mechanism	will	
spontaneously	reach	a	consensus.	













bilities	 for	energy	delivery,	while	 the	 true	contribution	of	 interconnections	
can	only	be	known	in	real-time,	and	results	from	a	conjunction	of	conditions	
in	different	systems?	And	how	to	allocate	energy	at	times	of	scarcity,	consid-
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1. Background: the emergence of national 
generation adequacy policies
The	 ability	 of	 energy-only	 markets	 to	 provide	 an	 adequate	
revenue	 stream	 to	 investors	 in	 generation	 assets	has	 recently	
been	questioned	 in	Europe.	The	“missing	money”	 issue	 is	 an	
old	debate,	which	 led	 -	 for	 instance	 -	 to	 the	 implementation	




Actually	 the	 current	wave	 of	 investment	 in	RES	 capacities	 is	
driven	 by	 support	 schemes.	Only	 the	 “outside	 of	 the	 energy	
market”	revenues	make	RES	investment	attractive	and	always	




security	 vis-à-vis	 the	 high	 RES	 intermittency.	 In	 the	 mean-
time	all	 the	 “classical”	flexible	generation	assets	 are	used	 less	
often	 than	before	 (on	average).	Several	 concerns	have	conse-
quently	been	raised	regarding	the	attractiveness	for	investment	
in	capacity	of	a	“wholesale	energy	only	market”	remuneration	
based	on	highly	volatile	 and	actually	 lower	wholesale	 energy	
prices.	






What	 the	European	systems	need	 is	 that	 the	right	amount	of	
back-up	resources	will	also	be	able	to	provide	the	right	amount	
and	profile	of	flexibility,	to	cope	with	the	system	variability	of	










CCGT	 fleet	 bleeds	 and	 the	 corresponding	 LNG	 terminals	
sleep...	 in	a	peninsula...	 as	 long	as	wind	blows	or	 sun	 shines.	
Such	 countries	 differences	 are	 resulting	 in	 a	wave	 of	 hetero-
1.	 See	for	instance	Joskow	(2013)	“Symposium	on	‘Capacity	Markets’”	Eco-
nomics	of	Energy	and	Environmental	Policy	2.2
geneous	 proposals	 for	 capacity	 remuneration	 mechanisms.	
With	 centralised,	 targeted	 “strategic	 reserves”	 in	Belgium,	 or	
“decentralised”,	market-wide	capacity	obligations	on	suppliers	
in	France.	It	is	therefore	unlikely	that	a	harmonised	European	












generation	 adequacy	 resources	 (as	 demand	 response,	 storage	
or	interconnectors).	
We	do	have	to	analyse	the	scope	and	to	understand	the	func-
tioning	 of	 national	 generation	 adequacy	 policies	 in	 our	 EU	
integrated	electricity	market.	
Our	policy	brief	first	explains	why	handling	security	of	supply	
on	 a	 purely	 national	 way	 will	 be	 prohibitively	 expensive	 if	
not	 purely	 counter-productive	 (with	 countries	 harming	 each	
other).	EU	and	Member	States	do	not	need	and	cannot	afford	
















2. A Europeanization of national 
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on	too	different	systems	and	resources	and	address	legitimately	
different	 security	 objectives	 or	 energy	 policies	 (the	 former	









2.1 Autarkical generation adequacy policies are 
inevitably more expensive
The	benefits	of	a	multi-lateral	(or	regional)	approach	towards	
security	 of	 supply	 are	 obvious	 by	 comparison	 to	 a	 national	
autarkical	 approach.	 First,	 current	 level	 of	 reserve	 margin	
and	 future	 needs	 vary	 across	 different	Member	 States.	 Some	
of	 these	 states	 experience	 large	 amount	 of	 surplus	 capacity,	
while	the	reserve	margins	are	shrinking	in	some	neighbouring	
countries.	 A	 multi-lateral	 reserve	 margin	 will	 therefore	 be	





Of	 course	 the	 stressing	 events	 are	 also	 partially	 correlated:	








costs,	as	 the	potential	 to	 share	capacity	 resources	available	at	




2.2 Generation adequacy policies will impact energy 
prices 








to	 the	 system	 needs	within	 a	 given	 timeframe)	 are	 two	 cor-





short-term	 signals	 from	 day-ahead	 to	 balancing	 horizon	 to	
ensure	 an	 optimal	 dispatch	 of	 generation	 and	 activation	 of	
flexible	 system	 components	 (either	 generation,	 demand	 or	
storage).	
Such	 a	 partition	 between	 long	 term	 adequacy	 building	 and	
short	term	flexibility	activation	seems	however	misleading.	The	
ability	 of	 system	 resources	 to	 start-up	 and	 ramp-up	 quickly,	
to	 cycle	 frequently,	 and	 to	 operate	 at	 low	 minimum	 loads	









2.3 The European Commission has the legal 









systems	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	 diversity	 of	 national	 balancing	
arrangements	and	reliability	standards.	The	Electricity	Direc-
tive	 20009/72/EC	 (article	 7)	 allows	Member	 States	 to	 imple-
ment	 “a tendering procedure or any procedure equivalent in 
terms of transparency and non-discrimination”,	in	the	interests	
of	security	of	supply.	
All	 of	 this	 said,	 the	 European	 Commission	 also	 has	 a	 solid	
weaponry	coming	from	internal	market’s	freedom	for	trade	or	
competition	policy	for	state	aid.	That	is	why	the	Commission	
will	 not	 let	 national	 schemes	 tearing	 into	 pieces	 the	 integra-
tion	of	internal	energy	market.	In	the	Commission’s	guidance	
on	public	interventions,	it	is	clearly	stated	that	“mechanisms to 
ensure generation adequacy should be open to all capacity which 
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can effectively contribute to meeting the required generation ade-
quacy standard, including from other Member States”.	
In	 order	 to	 prevent	 distortion	 of	 competition	 and	 trade,	 the	
Commission	has	two	powerful	weapons.	First	energy	is	legally	




States, when intervening to ensure generation adequacy, should 
choose the intervention which least distorts cross border trade 
and the effective functioning of the internal electricity market”.	
The	Commission	will	use	its	State	Aid	strong	powers	to	prevent	
or	 cure	any	public	 intervention	 that	would	unilaterally	harm	
or	 discriminate	 cross-border	 trade.	 However	 this	 Europe-
anization	process	will	be	quite	demanding	as	the	“technology	
neutrality”	 been	 required	 covers	 all	 “generation	 +	 storage	 +	
demand	response”	alternative	technologies	and	assets.	
3. A frame for a workable 
Europeanization of national generation 
adequacy mechanisms
It	 is	 now	 clear	 that	 national	 generation	 adequacy	 mecha-
nisms	must	take	into	account	the	contribution	of	cross-border	
resources.	Either	to	avoid	the	extra	costs	of	autarky	or	to	ensure	














3.1 A consistent assessment of adequacy needs and 
measurement of cross-border resources 
ACER,	in	its	report	on	capacity	remuneration	and	the	internal	
market,	 underlines	 that	 “the contribution from cross-border 
capacity to security of supply is often not taken into account 
sufficiently well when addressing national or local adequacy 
concerns”.	CEER	 in	 its	own	2014	 report	 “Assessment	of	 elec-
tricity	 generation	 adequacy	 in	 European	 countries”	 reminds	
the	remaining	difficulties	to	assess	regional	security	of	supply.	
It	states	that	national	generation	adequacy	outlooks	are	estab-
lished	 with	 no	 consistent	 definitions,	 methods	 or	 scenarios,	
and	in	most	cases	with	no	identification	of	the	impact	of	corre-
lated	events	at	regional	level	on	security	of	supply.	It	highlights	
an	 urgent	 need	 for	 harmonisation	 of	 methodologies	 within	
Europe.	 It	 calls	 for	 a	more	 robust	 and	 comprehensive	meth-
odology	to	assess	security	of	supply	at	a	regional	scale,	as	the	
direction	and	the	volume	of	flows	through	interconnectors	are	
the	 result	 of	 partially	 correlated	 conditions	 such	 as	 load	 and	
output	of	intermittent	RES	in	the	different	Member	States.	
We	see	two	ways	of	including	the	contribution	of	cross-border	
resources	 in	 national	 generation	 adequacy	 policies.	 A	 first	
“explicit”	 approach	 is	 to	allow	cross-border	 resources	 to	par-
ticipate	 by	 themselves	 (hence	 “explicitly”)	 in	 the	 process,	 in	







to	 implement.	 It	 is	not	used	 in	France,	 Italy,	 or	 the	UK.	The	
new	Irish	“Single Electricity Market”	has	developed	an	explicit	
approach	based	on	a	mark-up	on	imports,	and	a	mark-down	
on	 exports.	 On	 the	 continent	 the	 widespread	 “market	 cou-
pling”	makes	difficult	 to	 identify	 the	 resources	 imported	and	
the	ones	exported.	Moreover,	the	mark-ups	currently	include	a	
component	calculated	ex-post,	which	is	in	contradiction	with	




ment	 of	 the	 overall	 contribution	 of	 cross-border	 resources	
remains	 challenging.	 Indeed,	 despite	 high	 availability	 factors	
of	 interconnector,	 the	 availability	 of	 flows	 through	 intercon-
nectors	cannot	be	easily	guaranteed	until	real-time.	The	con-
tribution	 of	 interconnectors	 is	 actually	 highly	 variable	 and	
influenced	by	concomitant	conditions	across	several	European	
systems,	 making	 it	 difficult	 to	 foresee	 what	 to	 get	 from	 the	
interconnectors	at	times	of	stress.	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 sophisticated	 probabilistic	methodology,	
Member	 States	 might	 have	 to	 exclude	 the	 participation	 of	
resources	committed	in	another	generation	adequacy	mecha-
nism,	which	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘No double-counting’.	However,	
even	 in	neighbouring	systems,	 scarcity	events	are	rarely	con-
comitant.	 Some	 resources	will	 actually	 contribute	 to	 genera-
tion	adequacy	in	several	systems,	and	at	different	times.	The	‘no	
double-counting’	policy	therefore	overestimates	the	probability	
of	 concomitant	 stress	 events	 in	 different	 systems,	 leading	 to	
multi-lateral	overcapacity	and	extra	costs.	Mitigating	double-
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counting	 might	 come	 from	 refining	 the	 adequacy	 products,	
allowing	 the	 time-periods	 of	 commitments	 to	 match	 more	
accurately	the	needs	of	different	systems.	
First tool needed: assessment of generation 
adequacy at the regional level
How to establish a robust methodology to estimate the contri-
bution of cross-border resources? Is ensuring the consistency of 
national scenarios sufficient? 
Should some “ability” of resources to actually contribute to gen-
eration adequacy in several systems be considered? How then 
to refine national generation adequacy policies so as to avoid 
discrimination of cross-border resources?





border	 resources	 entails	 three	 prerequisites:	 1)	 the	 resource	
itself	must	be	available,	2)	 the	 interconnector	must	be	physi-
cally	 available,	 and	 3)	 energy	 must	 flow	 through	 the	 inter-
connector.	 Should	 the	 risks	 related	 to	 physical	 availability	 of	
interconnector	 and	 resources	 be	 allocated	 respectively	 to	 the	
interconnector	operator	and	the	resources	owner?	Both	being	




dicting	 these	 conditions	 over	 the	 long-term	 is	 problematic.	
And	who	could	handle	 the	associated	uncertainty	 in	absence	





Another	 issue	 is	 the	 remuneration	of	 cross-border	 resources.	
How	 to	 remunerate	 the	 overall	 contribution	 of	 cross-border	
resources	 in	case	of	an	“implicit”	approach	of	their	contribu-
tion?	How	should	these	revenues	be	shared	between	the	proper	
cross-border	 resources	 and	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 interconnector	
capacity?	 Should	 cross-border	 resources	 be	 responsible	 for	





Second tool needed: allocation of risks and 
remuneration for the contribution of cross-border 
resources
No player can efficiently manage alone all the risks of failed 
delivery of energy from cross-border resources. How should this 
risk then be allocated? And to whom: resource owners? Inter-
connectors? System Operators? 
And how to remunerate the cross-border resources and the 
interconnectors? 
3.3 Definition of rights over the system resources at 








their	 “own”	 adequacy.	This	 will	 become	 an	 issue	 at	 times	 of	
extreme	scarcity,	when	energy	prices	might	be	unable	to	keep	
energy	 flowing	 towards	 the	 “better”	 insured	 consumers	 or	
towards	highest	social	value	uses.	Current	rules	in	the	market	
coupling	 algorithm	 Euphemia	 for	 instance	 impose	 identical	











arrangements	 should	 apply.	 Generation	 adequacy	 is	 partly	 a	
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The Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the European Commission. The 
Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory 
topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and policies.
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The	 contribution	 of	 cross-border	 resources	will	 only	 be	 reli-
able	if	the	priority	of	foreign	demand	with	contracted	system	
adequacy	 is	 ensured	 over	 domestic	 demand	 without	 similar	
adequacy	 commitment.	This	 implies	 that	 national	 adequacy	
policies	 should	 be	 coordinated	 at	 a	 larger	 geographical	 scale	
(through	bilateral	or	multi-lateral	agreements).	A	first	option	
is	 to	make	 sure	 that	 the	 actual	 level	 of	 physical	 rationing	 of	
systems	 (or	 of	 their	 consumers)	 reflects	 the	 efforts	made	 ex	
ante	 to	be	 insured	against	 curtailment.	An	alternative	option	
is	 to	put	 into	place	a	financial	 compensation	 from	systems	–













abruptly	or	 too	soon...	 It	 looks	 like	a	 typical	decade-long	EU	
debate…
Third tool needed: allocation of rights to consume 
energy at times of scarcity
Can free-riding be avoided in case when different reliability 
standards and different generation adequacy policies are imple-
mented in Member States?
How to measure the efforts made by consumers under hetero-
geneous generation adequacy policies? How to determine the 
quantity of energy that consumers are entitled to at times of 
scarcity and what should be the value of financial compensa-
tion when necessary? Finally, how to ensure compatibility with 
a spirit of solidarity?
